Spousal influence on early retirement behavior by Jia, Zhiyang
Discussion Papers No. 406, Feburary 2004 
Statistics Norway, Research Department 
Zhiyang Jia 
Spousal Influence on Early 
Retirement Behavior 
Abstract: 
In this paper, we use a binary choice panel data model to analyze married individuals.retirement 
behavior in Norway when a new option, AFP early retirement becomes available. We focus our study 
on the influence of the spouse.s characteristics on early retirement behavior. We find the directions 
of spousal e¤ects are quite symmetric but women seem to have a much stronger response to their 
spouses' characteristics than men. The comparison of di¤erent specifications indicates that correct 
modeling of the error term covariance structure in a panel data binary choice model is quite 
important. 
 
Keywords: Retirement, Spousal Influence, Panel Data, Random Effects. 
JEL classification: H55, J26 
Acknowledgement: I thank John Dagsvik and Steinar Strøm for helpful comments, Fedor Iskhakov 
for preparing part of data used in this analysis.Financial support from the Research Council of 
Norway (project 140082/530) is gratefully acknowledged. 
Address: Zhiyang Jia, Statistics Norway, Research Department. E-mail: Zhiyang.jia@ssb.no 
 
 
Discussion Papers comprise research papers intended for international journals or books. A preprint of a 
Discussion Paper may be longer and more elaborate than a standard journal article, as it 
may include intermediate calculations and background material etc. 
 
 
 
 
Abstracts with downloadable Discussion Papers  
in PDF are available on the Internet: 
http://www.ssb.no 
http://ideas.repec.org/s/ssb/dispap.html 
 
 
For printed Discussion Papers contact: 
 
Statistics Norway 
Sales- and subscription service  
NO-2225 Kongsvinger 
 
Telephone: +47 62 88 55 00 
Telefax: +47 62 88 55 95 
E-mail:  Salg-abonnement@ssb.no 
1 Introduction:
In this paper, we apply a binary choice panel data model to study the early retirement
behavior using Norwegian data. The analysis is based on the married individuals who
are qualied for a subsidized early retirement scheme hereafter called AFP (a Norwegian
abbreviation). We focus on the understanding of how the early retirement decisions are
a¤ected by the spousal characteristics such as labor market status, income and wealth
etc. Di¤erent specications of the model are discussed and estimated.
Recent studies of retirement behavior have recognized the phenomenon that hus-
bands and wives often coordinate their labor supply at older ages. Among them, Blau
(1997) nds strong associations between the labor force transition probabilities of one
spouse and the labor force status of the other spouse.Using data from US Health and
Retirement Study (HRS), Johnson and Favreault (2001) nd that the employment and
health status of the spouse appear to have important e¤ects on retirement decisions for
married women and men. Similar patterns have also been found on European data,
see for example, Blau and Rihahn (1999) and Jimenez-Martin, Labeeaga, and Granado
(1999).
This phenomenon, in turn, has generated lots of literature on possible sources of this
coordination in elderly labor supply. However, few discusses another important aspect
of this issue, namely whether the husbandscharacteristics a¤ect the behavior of wives
di¤erently from the way wivescharacteristics a¤ect their husbandsbehavior, and which
one is stronger. Among the limited literature, there are mixed conclusions. Schellenberg
(1994) conducts a survey and nds that men are far less inuenced by their spouses
situation than women in Canada. On the other hand, Gustman and Steinmeier (2000)
reach just the opposite conclusion based on some old US National Longitudinal Survey
data from 1970s and 1980s. They state that There is some suggestion in the data
that the wifes retirement decision is not strongly inuenced by the husbands, but the
husbands decision is more strongly inuenced by the wifes. This is conrmed by Coile
(2003)s study on much recent data from HRS. She nds that the response of women
to their own incentive measures is virtually identical to the response of men. Spill-over
e¤ects from the wife are important determinants of husbands retirement, while the
spill-over e¤ects from the husband are small and statistically insignicant.
One of the most important reasons for the limited literature on comparing spousal
e¤ects might be the lack of proper data due to the low participation rate of the elderly
women. However, the labor force participation for elderly women has increased dramat-
ically in most western countries during the last decades. In Norway, the participation
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rate for women aged 55-66 rose from 40 per cent in 1972 to 54 per cent in 1997 (Dahl,
Nilsen, and Vaage (2003)). Similar patterns are documented for US in Coile (2003).
This gives us a chance to study spousal e¤ect for not only married men but also married
women.
There are several studies of retirement behavior based on Norwegian data. Among
them, Dahl, Nilsen, and Vaage (2003) take family characteristics such as spousal income,
wealth and labor market status into account when they analyze labor market behavior
for elderly men and women. Using a multinomial logit model on pooled yearly data,
they mainly focus their study on gender di¤erence and have not paid much attention to
the di¤erence in spousal e¤ects.
In this paper, we model the early retirement as a sequence of yearly decisions while
taking the spouses labor market status as exogenous. We take the advantage of the panel
structure of the available data, which gives us the possibility to incorporate unobserved
heterogeneity across the sample.
Our paper di¤ers from Dahl, Nilsen, and Vaage (2003) mainly on two aspects. First,
we have a much richer structure on the unobserved error term. The error term is assumed
to be the sum of two parts: an individual-specic time-invariant part and a transitory
part. The rst part is there to incorporate the unobserved heterogeneity across the
sample. In addition, we allow a very general autocorrelation structure on the transitory
component. Second, unlike simply pooling the data from di¤erent year together as done
in Dahl, Nilsen, and Vaage (2003), we take into account the repeated self-selection in
the data set to eliminate the selection bias that arises when we allow for unobserved
heterogeneity.
The model is estimated on married individuals qualied for AFP between 1994 and
1997. The results show that the employment status and other characteristics of the
spouse have important e¤ects on early retirement decision for married men and women.
We nd the direction of spousal e¤ects are quite symmetric but women have a much
stronger response to their spousescharacteristics than men. This indicates that joint
modeling of coupleslabor market behavior is appropriate. In addition, by comparing
di¤erent specications of the panel probit model, our study shows that failure to correctly
model the cross individual heterogeneity structure (i.e. the intertemporal covariance
structure of the error term) might lead to completely erroneous conclusions.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we discuss the model setup.
Data and empirical specications are presented in section 3. Section 4 reports the
estimation results. The conclusion is elaborated in section 5.
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2 The Model
In this paper, we concentrate on the spousal e¤ects on the early retirement behavior of
married men and women, and use a reduced form modeling framework.
There are mainly two reasons why we do not use a structural retirement model for this
analysis. Firstly, the labor market decision process of the couples is quite complicated,
and we are still in a stage of guring out how it works. Many approaches on modeling
family labor supply have been discussed in the literature. For a survey of these models,
see Bergstrom (1997), Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). Roughly, the literature can be
divided into two strands, the cooperative and non-cooperative approaches. They di¤er
substantially on the underlying behavioral assumptions. Although there are analyses
which compare the empirical performance of some of those competing models such as
Hernæs, Jia, and Strøm (2001), the literature is still limited and no consensus has been
reached so far. By making a particular behavioral assumption of the decision process,
which we are not sure is a correct one, there is a risk that we might have already restricted
the spousal e¤ects to have certain counterfactual patterns. Moreover, in a behavioral
model, certain points of interest can be obscured in the mist of complicated interactions.
For example, in a household labor supply model where the decisions are assumed to be
the outcome of a Nash game, the question: what will be the e¤ect of an increase in
the wifes labor income by 10 per cent on husbands labor decision, cannot be answered
without numerical simulations.
Secondly, reduced form models can be thought as approximations of certain labor
market decision rules derived from some unknown behavioral models, as Blau and Rihahn
(1999) point out. No specic behavioral assumptions need to be made. The reduced
models are relatively simpler to implement compared with the structural models, and
easier to interpret. Those reduced form models for retirement range from simple probit
or logit used by Coile (2003), Dahl, Nilsen, and Vaage (2003), to bivariate duration
model developed by An, Christensen, and Gupta (1999), or to dynamic multinomial
probit model applied in Blau and Rihahn (1999).
In this study, we are not interested in recovering the utility parameters for any of
the spouse. The behavioral assumptions we make in this model should be as weak as
possible to avoid the assumption contaminating our results. Given all these concerns,
we specify a reduced form model that is in the spirit of Blau and Rihahn (1999). The
parameters in our model may represent a certain combination of the preferences of both
spouses and some other factors that inuence the decision. But since the model can be
seen as a decision rule that is the result of some complicated decision processes instead,
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the parameters do have quite straightforward interpretations.
2.1 The Model Setup
We model the early retirement as a sequence of yearly decisions from the date of the
qualication.
We dene t = 1 at the year of AFP qualication. The available choices at period t
for each individual i are either taking out the early retirement (yit = 1) or continuing to
work (yit = 0).
Let yit represent the net value of retiring at time t. We will assume a linear approx-
imation to the underlying function that determines yit:
yit = xit + uit i = 1; 2; :::; N ; t = 1; 2; :::Ti: (1)
Here xit is a vector of observed explanatory variables which include wage, pension,
spouses labor market status etc.  is the unknown parameter vector. uit is the unob-
served disturbance. Ti is number of observation periods for individual i:
At time t; the individual chooses to retire only when the net value of retiring at time
t is no less than 0, i.e.:
yit =
(
1 if yit  0; and
0 otherwise.
(2)
We are not able to observe the net value of retirement yit, only the retirement behav-
ior yit. Moreover, the individual drops out from the panel once he takes out retirement.
Namely, we only observe yit when yit 1 = 0, since retirement is assumed to be an ab-
sorbing state. As a consequence, state dependence in terms of lagged dependent variable
is not relevant in our setting, since for all the observations in our sample, we always have
yit 1 = 0.
Modeling of the unobserved disturbance uit is not straight forward. In the present
study, the unobserved disturbance is assumed to consist of two part: i is a permanent
individual specic e¤ect that does not change over time, which is meant to capture the
unobserved heterogeneity across the individuals. "it is a transitory part. Namely:
uit = i + "it: (3)
If we assume there is no unobserved heterogeneity, that is i = 0, and assume that
"it is i:i:d: distributed, then the panel data structure is irrelevant and we can simply
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pool all the data together. The choice probability will have a Logit/Probit structure,
depending on the distributional assumption on "it: This is essentially what has been
done in Dahl, Nilsen, and Vaage (2003). Although as we can see later, the assumption
that no unobserved heterogeneity across the sample is not valid in our study, we will
still estimate of a pooled probit model for comparison reasons.
If we treat i as unknown parameters together with , we will have a xed e¤ect
model. Maximum likelihood estimation method can be used to estimate the xed e¤ect
model. However, the estimators are only consistent in the sense that both the observation
number N and the number of time periods T can tend towards to innity. In practice,
we usually only have quite small T , both the parameters of interest and the nuisance
parameters (xed e¤ects) can not be estimated consistently because of the so-called
incidental parameters problempointed out by Neyman and Scott (1948). The general
solution is to apply the conditional likelihood model suggested by Chamberlain (1984).
But it is not possible in our case, due to the fact that we only observe the transition
from working to retirement not vice versa.
For this reason, in the second specication of our model, we take a standard random
e¤ect approach and assume that i is random across individuals and normally distributed
with mean 0 and variance 2. One important restriction of the standard random e¤ect
model is the assumption that the correlation between the disturbance uit for any two
decision points is the same regardless of how far apart the decisions are. However, uit
may reect the tastes that gradually change over time, then one should expect that the
correlation is bigger with shorter period in between. A typical solution to this problem
is to specify a dynamic structure for the transitory error "it as well. So for the third
specication, similar to Hyslop (1999) and Michaud (2003), we assume that "it follows
a stationary AR(1) process with autocorrelation coe¢ cient ,
"it = "it 1 + vit; (4)
where the innovation vit is assumed to be i.i.d. normal distributed over individuals and
time with mean 0 and variance 2v
When we consider the specications discussed above, we notice that even with an
AR(1) transitory error term, the intertemporal covariance structure is still quite restric-
tive. Ideally, we would like to specify that "it and "is are freely correlated. As the last
specication, we would like to estimate a panel binary choice model with an uncon-
strained covariance structure.
Let T = maxi(Ti), and  be a T T positive denite covariance matrix. We assume
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that ("i1;    "iTi) is Ti-variate normally distributed with mean 0 and a covariance matrix
(i) which is the Tith leading principal submatrix of : Recall that i  N(0; 2),
and using (3), we see that the total disturbance (ui1;   uiTi) is also Ti-variate normally
distributed with mean 0. However, the covariance matrix is now (ITi denotes the identity
matrix of rank Ti):
2ITi +(i):
It follows immediately that with an unconstrained covariance structure on "it; we
will not be able to identify 2 separately from : In other words, the cross individual
heterogeneity can not be distinguished from the simple cross period correlation. So we
can ignore the individual e¤ect i in this setting.
One of the most important reasons for the popularity of the simple random e¤ect
model is that the cost of evaluating high dimensional integral expressions. However,
with the development of hardware as well as the simulation methods such as the GHK
simulator and Simulated MLE, this is no longer the case.
3 Data and Empirical Specications:
3.1 Sample Construction
We use data from the merged administrative registers at the Frisch Centre1. The data
contain detailed socio-economic information and give an account of the main labor mar-
ket activities for virtually the whole Norwegian adult population.
We rst restrict our sample to married individuals qualied for AFP between 1994
and 1997, when the AFP qualication age is constant at 64. The qualication of AFP
requires: 1) currently employed and have earnings higher than the basic pension G2 ,
2) at least 10 years of work experience since the age of 50, 3) at least 3 yearstenure in
the present rm, 4) an average of the 10 highest yearly income after 1966 exceeding at
least 2G. The observations are then censored upon dissolution of marriage for any reason
(death of the principle person or the spouse is the most important factor here) during
the period of analysis. We suspect that those who have very high personal income may
have di¤erent incentives on retirement decisions. So we exclude those who have labor
earning higher than 1,000,000 NOK or business income higher than 500,000 NOK. In
1The original data have been received from Statistics Norway, and held by the Frisch Centre with
permission for research use.
2G is a crucial parameter in the Norwegian pension system, used for dening contributions as well as
benets. The amount is adjusted by the Parliament once or more times each year, in accordance with
changes in the general income level.
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this study, disability retirement is not considered as a voluntary choice, so those who
actually took out disability pension during our observation period are also excluded in
our sample.
Starting from the year of eligibility, we track the labor market status on yearly bases
for all individuals in the data set until they take out the early retirement or the ordinary
retirement age of 67 is reached. The maximum number of observed period is 3, since at
the starting period the individuals are all 64 years old. For those who retire at the year
of eligibility we only have one observation per individual.
The resulted data set for men contains 9971 individuals and 18707 observations,
while the data set for women contains 6210 individuals and 11628 observations.
3.2 Empirical Specications:
We write the deterministic part of (1) as the following:
xit = 0 + Zitz + Sits, (5)
where Zit is a vector of the individuals own characteristics. Sit is a vector of the spouses
characteristics.
3.2.1 Own characteristics Zit
For the individuals own characteristics, we include a series of demographic variables:
age, years of education, the number of dependent children (children under 18 years old).
Personal wealth from tax authority is also included in our analysis.
We include incomes for both continuing to work and taking out AFP retirement in
the analysis. Since the individuals can only be observed in one state, either working or
retired, we need to impute potential AFP pension or potential wage income. For wage
income, we exploit the fact that all the individuals in our sample have been working
before entering the sample and specify a simple autoregressive process for the log(waget)
as follows:
log(wt+1) = 1 + 2 log(wt) + 3(log(wt))
2 + 4aget + 5age
2
t + t; (6)
where aget denotes the individuals age at period t, and t is i:i:d: normal distributed
with mean 0 and variance 2 : The quadratic specication allows for an age income prole.
The regression is done separately for men and women. Table (1) shows the results
from the estimation of this model. Both regressions have quite high R2 (>90%), which
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Men Women
Variable Parameter Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
constant ^1 0.175 0.82 -18.189 11.35
log(wt) ^2 -0.871 0.009 0.439 0.17
log2(wt) ^3 0.727 0.004 0.022 0.007
age ^4 0.03 0.51 0.667 0.35
age2 ^5 -2.4e-4 1.9e-4 -0.005 0.002
R2 0.94 0.92
^2 7.1e-3 8.0e-3
Number of observations 9617 6260
Table 1: Estimation results for wage regression equations, men and women
indicates a very good tting. The estimates then are used to impute the wage income
when the individual is observed not working at time t; based on the wage income of last
year using a Markovian updating formula:
wt+1 = exp(^1 + ^2 log(wt) + ^3(log(wt))
2 + ^4aget + ^5age
2
t + ^
2
=2): (7)
The AFP pension is calculated using detailed pension rules. Both of these income
variables are net of taxes using detailed tax rules with all the spousal characteristics
considered. (Both the pension rules and the tax rules can be found in Haugen (2000))
We are also interested in whether the employer specic variables inuence the re-
tirement behavior. We include a dummy on whether the individual is working in the
private sector. We also try to construct a rm specic employment reduction dummy
to proxy rms labor demand. However, due to some data problems on identifying rms
throughout time, the dummy variable we generated is not of high accuracy. We need to
bear it in mind when we interpret the results.
One important factor which inuences the retirement behavior is the health condi-
tion. Based on the data we have, we construct a yearly sick-leave ratio, which measures
the fraction of sick leave during the year prior to the year of decision.
Social norms have been considered to be an important factor in the retirement de-
cision making process in recent years. We use a county level gender specic retirement
ratio as a measure of the social norm. It is dened as the fraction of pensioners of the
same gender in the county where the individual lives.
10
00.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
working AFP Pension Disability OLF
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Figure 1: Mens retirement hazard over the three periods, grouped by their spouses
labor market status
3.2.2 Spouses characteristics Sit
The most important variable for the spouse is the labor market status. Spouses are
categorized into ve states: work, early retirement, on disability pension, other pensions
(including ordinary retirement at age 67), and out of labor force. The spouses are classi-
ed as in the working state if they can be found in the work register le or their annual
labor earnings from tax le are more than 50,000 NOK. The states, early retirement
and on disability pension, are easy to identify, given that we have detailed register les
on those activities. The state other pensionsincludes those on ordinary pension, and
those who are observed to have pension income greater than 80,000 NOK in the tax le.
Those who are not in any of four states above are then classied as out of labor force.
We also include spouses age, actual income and personal wealth in our analysis.
Unfortunately, we are not be able construct a similar health indicator for the spouse.
The reason is simple  only those who are working have the sick leave data. On disability
pension might be used as a proxy for bad health. But we need to be very careful, since
the eligibility criteria have been lax for older workers.
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Figure 2: Womens retirement hazard over the three periods, grouped by their spouses
labor market status
3.3 Some Summary Statistics
The summary statistics for both data sets are given in table (2). We see from the table
that although on average men and women have similar years of education (12.6 years
for men versus 11.5 years for women), women earn much less and have accumulated less
wealth than men. The average AFP pension replacement ratio for both men and women
are around 60 per cent. The redistribution e¤ect of the AFP scheme is apparent. The
standard deviation of the AFP pension income is only around 30 per cent of that of wage
income for men, and 40 per cent for women. Husbands are, on average, 3 years older
than wives. This explains the di¤erent patterns of spouses labor market status between
men and women.
Figure (1) and (2) give the early retirement hazard rates over the three observed
periods, grouped by their spouseslabor market status. We see a general trend that the
retirement hazard rate is decreasing regardless of their spousesstatus when t increases.
And the di¤erences between the di¤erent groups seem to diminish over time.
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Men Women
mean std mean std
Own characteristics Zit
Age 64.64 0.76 64.65 0.76
Working in private sector 0.68 0.47 0.49 0.50
Number of dependent children 0.03 0.22 0.001 0.02
Work income (net of tax) 1.92 0.57 1.33 0.39
AFP income (net of tax) 1.10 0.16 0.82 0.16
Sick ratio in last year 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.12
Years of education 12.57 3.54 11.49 2.84
Share of retirees in same county 0.25 0.05 0.29 0.05
Firm downsizing 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.33
Wealth 4.77 8.04 2.08 2.94
Spousal characteristics Sit
Age 61.02 4.50 67.81 4.20
Wealth 1.41 2.91 3.80 7.14
Income 1.00 0.58 1.47 0.73
AFP retired 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.17
Pension 0.07 0.26 0.59 0.49
On disability 0.20 0.40 0.09 0.28
Out of labor force 0.15 0.35 0.01 0.07
Note: all the income variables and wealth variables are in 100000 NOK
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
4 Estimation Results
In this section we present the results for several di¤erent specications of the early
retirement decision model discussed in section 2.1. All the specications are estimated
separately for men and women.
We rst present estimates from a pooled probit model which ignores the panel struc-
ture of the data. We use it mainly as a benchmark for comparison purpose. Following
this, estimates for several panel data models are reported and discussed. These panel
data models include a static random e¤ect model, a dynamic panel model with AR(1)
transitory error terms and a dynamic panel model with no restriction on the covariance
structure of the transitory error terms.
We then provide a discussion of possible determinant factors of early retirement
behavior based on these results.
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4.1 Pooled Probit Model
The simplest way to deal with panel data on discrete choice models might be simply
pooling the data together and assume independence over both time horizon and individ-
uals, instead of using only one of the cross-sections. This leads to a pooled probit/logit
model. Both Coile (2003) and Dahl, Nilsen, and Vaage (2003) apply this framework.
In most cases, compared with the single cross section, the pooled estimators are
usually more e¢ cient due to the increased sample size. Even when there are correlations
among the error terms uit in the net value formula (1), Maddala (1987) argues that
ignoring these correlations among the errors and using a standard Probit estimation
method with pooled data produces consistent (though ine¢ cient) estimates. However,
this is not true for studies of retirement when retirement is considered as an absorbing
state. In this case, those who retire at time t will drop out sample from t + 1. This is
essentially equivalent to a repeated self-selection. Simply pooling data together when
there are individual specic e¤ects and repeated self-selection will lead to inconsistent
estimates of the parameters.
To make this point clear, denote the pooled sample log-likelihood function as:
Sn(b) =
X
t
X
i
ln(Pr(xit + uit  0)yi + Pr(xit + uit < 0)1 yi); (8)
and the maximum likelihood estimator bn is dened as bn = argmax
b
(Sn(b)):
For bn to be consistent, we need to have the conditional mean restriction
Mean(i + "itjxit; yit 1 = 0) = 0; for all t:
However, in our case, this mean condition cannot be satised due to the self-selection.
The individuals who remain in the sample at t > 1 have smaller values of i than those
who retire at t = 1. Consequently, Mean(yitjxi; yit 1 = 0) < 0 for t > 1. This violates
the conditional mean condition and thus leads to inconsistency of the estimator bn.
For comparison reasons, we include the pooled probit estimates for both men and
women in table (3). A striking result for both men and women is that the e¤ects of
their own age on the retirement decision are both signicantly negative. It suggests that
the older the individuals are, the less likely they will take out retirement when other
variables are controlled for. When we notice that in our sample, all the individuals
are 64 years old at year of eligibility t = 1; we see immediately that it is due to the
phenomenon that the larger t is, the lower is the hazard rate of retirement. Recall
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Men Women
Variable Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
Constant 17.4531 0.9224 21.6149 1.1465
Own characteristics Zit
Age -0.2716 0.0150 -0.3364 0.0188
Working in private sector 0.2101 0.0218 0.1123 0.0241
Number of dependent children -0.1059 0.0479 0.1123 1.0839
Work income (net of tax) -0.3031 0.0283 -0.7721 0.0539
AFP income (net of tax) 0.0970 0.1122 0.8022 0.1336
Sick ratio in last year 0.7987 0.0930 0.6926 0.0998
Years of education -0.0271 0.0037 0.0099 0.0052
Share of retirees in same county 0.5156 0.1976 -0.1240 0.2502
Firm downsizing -0.0196 0.0266 0.0034 0.0364
Wealth -0.0000 0.0013 -0.0004 0.0044
Spousal characteristics Sit
Age 0.0064 0.0026 -0.0013 0.0041
Wealth 0.0096 0.0036 0.0045 0.0019
Income -0.0494 0.0279 0.0173 0.0214
AFP retired 0.1331 0.0762 0.3848 0.0742
Pension -0.0544 0.0432 0.1056 0.0374
On disability -0.0318 0.0275 0.0607 0.0489
Out of Labor Force -0.0874 -0.0443 -0.2305 0.1938
Loglikelihood -11798.32 -7351.06
Number of Cases 9971 6210
Note: the standard errors are calculated using BHHH method and have been
corrected for panel data.
Table 3: Pooled Probit Model of Early Retirement Behavior, Men and Women
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that with individual specic e¤ects, the individuals who remain in the sample at t have
higher attachment to the labor market (lower i) than those who retire at t   1. The
signicant negative parameter estimates for age might just be a consequence of ignoring
the individual specic e¤ect and the repeated self-selection.
4.2 Random E¤ect Probit Models
In table (4), two versions of the random e¤ect model are presented for both men and
women.
The rst version is a standard random e¤ect model, with assumption that i is i:i:d:
normal distributed with mean 0 and variance 2 across the individuals.
The second version allows an AR(1) structure on the transitory error terms "it.
Namely "it = "it 1+ vit; where vit is assumed to be i:i:d: normal distributed with mean
0 and variance 2v: Similar specication can be found in Hyslop (1999) and Michaud
(2003).
Like other discrete choice models, some normalizations are required for identica-
tion. For both versions, we normalize the variance of the overall error term uit to 1, i.e.
var(uit) = 1: The main reason for using this normalization is that under this normal-
ization both estimates will have the same scale, which makes the comparison of those
two models quite straight forward. Furthermore, under this normalization the estimated
variance of i has the interpretation as the share of unobserved heterogeneity in the total
variance of the stochastic component uit: In the AR(1) specication, given var(i) = 2a
and the AR(1) coe¢ cient , it implies that 2v = (1  2a)(1  2).
We see from table (4) that after allowing for the individual heterogeneity and au-
tocorrelation in the transitory term, the coe¢ cient for age no longer has the signicant
negative sign. This conrms our hypothesis that the wrong sign of the parameters is
mainly due to the failure to take into account of the individual specic e¤ect and the
repeated self-selection. This also gives a nice empirical illustration for the inconsistency
problem we discussed in the last section.
For both men and women, the AR(1) coe¢ cients are signicantly di¤erent from
zero. In comparison to the pure random e¤ect model, the addition of a serial correlated
transitory component in error term improve the model tting substantially. However,
the negative sign of the AR(1) coe¢ cients seems to be somewhat counter-intuitive, since
we expect that the shorter the period apart from each other, the stronger the correlation
will be. Interestingly, both Hyslop (1999) and Michaud (2003) nd the similar results in
their study of dynamic probit models when the state dependence is present.
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4.3 A Panel Probit Model with unconstrained covariance structure
As discussed in section 2.1, with a freely specied covariance structure of the transitory
disturbances "it; we will not be able to identify the individual specic e¤ect i in the
random e¤ect modeling framework. So we make assumption directly on the total dis-
turbance. We assume that (ui1;    ; uiT ) is normally distributed with mean 0 and an
unconstrained covariance matrix . As shown in Greene (2002), this setting can be in-
terpreted as a special case of random e¢ cient probit/mixed probitwith only a random
constant term which embodies the latent heterogeneity.
Similar to the standard random e¤ect model discussed in last section, normalization
is required to ensure identication. However, normalization of all the diagonal elements
is unnecessary because the slope vector is time invariant. So only one main diagonal
element of the covariance matrix is required to be normalized. We will simply normalize
var(ui1) = 1: To ensure the positive deniteness of the covariance matrix, instead of
directly specifying the parameters for the covariance matrix , we choose to specify
the Cholesky decomposition of . Namely, we assume that  = LL0 where L is a
lower-triangular matrix which is dened as
L =
0B@ 1L21 L22
L31 L32 L33
1CA : (9)
The elements Lij of this Cholesky factor are the parameters to be estimated in the
model.
Estimation results for this unconstrained covariance panel probit model are reported
in table (5).
From the estimates, we see that the log-likelihood value improves considerably. The
hypotheses that var(uit) = 1; t = 2; 3 are both rejected at 1% level. The estimated
covariance matrices for ordinary random e¤ect, AR(1) and unconstrained covariance
specication are reported in table (6)
We see from table (6) that for both men and women, the estimated covariance ma-
trices for these three di¤erent specications vary a lot. For men, the unconstrained
covariance matrix actually shows that the shorter the time distance, the stronger the
correlation between the error terms, despite that autocorrelation coe¢ cient estimates
from the AR(1) are signicantly negative. However, this is not the case for women.
Anyway, this result suggests that the negative autocorrelation parameter reported in
Hyslop (1999) and Michaud (2003) might be due to the restriction that the error terms
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Men Women
Variable Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
Constant -0.5511 10.4183 44.3187 33.5199
Own characteristics Zit
Age 0.0074 0.1630 -0.6941 0.5238
Working in private sector 0.3305 0.0287 0.2111 0.0320
Number of children below 18 -0.0975 0.0575 0.0690 1.4931
Work income (net of tax) -0.5655 0.0417 -1.1688 0.0770
AFP income (net of tax) 0.5543 0.1626 1.3376 0.1828
Sick ratio in last year 1.1060 0.1197 1.0569 0.1392
Years of education -0.0426 0.0050 0.0022 0.0068
Share of retirees in same county 0.5961 0.2538 0.2948 0.3253
Firm downsizing -0.0078 0.0320 0.0290 0.0478
Wealth 0.0032 0.0017 -0.0026 0.0065
Spousal characteristics Sit
Age 0.0089 0.0034 -0.0004 0.0055
Wealth 0.0145 0.0048 0.0063 0.0020
Income -0.0443 0.0367 0.0343 0.0292
AFP retired 0.2888 0.1125 0.5486 0.0925
Pension -0.0057 0.0578 0.1613 0.0476
On disability -0.0011 0.0356 0.1312 0.0598
Out Labor Force -0.0876 0.0556 -0.3716 0.2292
Covariance structure L
L21 0.4868 0.1692 -0.0088 0.4819
L22 1.7691 0.2456 3.1564 0.8711
L31 0.2852 0.4229 1.1464 0.4527
L32 1.9091 0.6315 -0.0157 1.3755
L33 1.3968 0.4252 2.3367 0.6543
Loglikelihood 11665.1 7252.356
Number of Cases 9971 6210
Table 5: Random E¤ect Model with Unconstrained Covariance Matrix
Standard Random E¤ect AR(1) Unconstrained Covariance
Men
0@ 10:29 1
0:29 0:29 1
1A 0@ 10:35 1
0:82 0:35 1
1A 0@ 10:49 3:37
0:29 3:51 5:67
1A
Women
0@ 10:11 1
0:11 0:11 1
1A 0@ 10:19 1
0:77 0:19 1
1A 0@ 1 0:01 9:96
1:15  0:06 6:77
1A
Table 6: Estimated Covariance Matrices from the three specications of errors
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have equal variance across time.
Using likelihood ratio tests, all the other specications can be rejected with quite
high level of signicance.
4.4 Determinant factors of early retirement behavior
We base our discussion of the estimation results on the unconstrained covariance struc-
ture specication (table (5)).
4.4.1 E¤ects of own characteristics
When controlling for other variables, own age seems to have no signicant e¤ect on early
retirement decision for both men and women. Given the fact that all the individuals in
our sample are qualied for AFP, and the relative small range of variation (64-66), it is
not unreasonable.
The e¤ects of working income and benets are in the expected direction. We expect
that higher wages and lower benets corresponding to a strong attachment to the labor
force. The results support our hypothesis. Increased working income signicantly reduces
the probability of taking out early retirement, while increased AFP pension income has
an opposite e¤ect. Similar to Blau and Rihahn (1999) and Dahl, Nilsen, and Vaage
(2003), we also nd that the response for women is much stronger compared to men,
which is consistent to the generally higher labor supply elasticities for women than men
found in the literature. The inuences of own wealth on early retirement are less obvious.
The estimated parameters are not signicant for both men and women.
We expect that the length of education will have a negative e¤ect on the early
retirement decision, for those who with higher investment on human capital will be less
inclined to exit the labor market. We do nd the expected e¤ect for men, while the
e¤ect for women has wrong sign but with quite high standard error, thus is far from
signicant.
Since husbands generally are older than their wives, there are more men than women
with dependent children (younger than 18 years) in our sample. Similar to Dahl, Nilsen,
and Vaage (2003), we nd that having dependent children tends to reduce the probability
of early retirement for man. The e¤ect for women is negligible since there are too few
women with dependent children in our sample (less than 0.1%).
We specify our model to include a proxy of health condition: the sick leave ratio
during the year before eligibility to AFP. It may not be a precise measurement of the
health condition. But we expect that it has a high correlation with the actual health
20
condition. The estimates do show a quite high propensity to early retirement for those
with higher sick leave ratios during the last year. The same pattern holds for both men
and women.
Sociologists who study retirement behavior are interested in factors like norms, family
features etc, which have not been discussed much in the economic literature. We include
a crude measure of social acceptance of retirement in our study, namely the share of
retirees in the county where the individual lives in. Interestingly, we nd that the
retirement behavior seems to be positively inuenced by this share. In other words,
keeping other variables constant, individuals who live in the county with higher share of
retirees are more likely to take out the early retirement. This holds for both men and
women, although it is not signicant for women.
Working in the private sector has a positive e¤ect on taking out early retirement.
And the e¤ect is bigger for men. It might be due to the fact that working life in the
private sector is tougher than that in public sector, or more importantly, due to the
fact that we are not be able to observe the occupational pension in the private sector.
The nding is in line with what found in Hernæs, Jia, and Strøm (2001). Rather out of
our expectation, belonging to a downsizing rm doesnt have a signicant e¤ect on the
retirement behavior. One reason for this could be that the data quality of this variable
is poor as we discussed in earlier section.
4.4.2 Spousal spill-over e¤ects
Turning to the spouses characteristics, we nd that spouses age seems to have a positive
e¤ect on the retirement for men, while a non-signicant negative e¤ect for women. For
men, similar patterns are also documented in Hernæs, Jia, and Strøm (2001).
High spousal income implies a reduction of the probability of early retirement for
man, while the opposite for women. However, none of these e¤ects are signicant. The
spouses wealth does have a signicant positive e¤ect for both men and women. This
might be due to the argument that increased wealth will improve the possibility of early
retirement through the increased ability of self-support, as mentioned by Dahl, Nilsen,
and Vaage (2003).
Using working spouse as the reference group, for men, wife being a AFP pension
receiver has a quite strong positive e¤ect on early retirement. With a wife who is
classied as out of labor force, the probability for the husband to take out early retirement
is reduced. Two hypotheses are usually discussed in the literature, the added worker
e¤ect and the complementary of leisure e¤ect. The added worker e¤ect says that when
21
one spouse is not working and has limited resources, we would expect compensating
behavior from the other, namely non-working wife may correlate with a low probability
of early retirement. While the complementarity of leisure hypothesis stating that the
couples put high value on their joint leisure than leisure enjoyed just by one of them, we
would expect that the probability of taking out early retirement will be higher if he has a
non-working wife. No conclusion can be made in general on which is dominant from our
estimation results. The reduced early retirement probability for husband with wife who
is out of labor force supports the added worker hypothesis. And the strong positive e¤ect
of an AFP wife on the probability can be seen as an evidence of the complementarity
of leisure hypothesis. Note that the state out of labor forceis corresponding to quite
low income or zero income, it is no surprising the added worker e¤ect dominates. When
a non-working state corresponding to enough income such as pension etc, the budget
constraints are less important, thus the complementarity of leisure e¤ect dominates.
Similar picture can be found for women, but these e¤ects are more sharply determined
and much stronger than those we nd for men. For women, non-working spouse increases
the probability of retirement except the case when the husband are observed to be out
of labor force.
An interesting point to note is that the spouse being in the state of AFP retired seems
to have the highest e¤ect on probability of early retirement, for both men and women.
Possible explanations for this are as follows. On one hand, early retirement through
AFP is fully voluntary, so planning of retirement through this path way is possible.
On the other hand, the relative generous AFP pension makes the budget constraints
not so important. These two factors combined together greatly increase the freedom of
coordination of the retirement within the family.
In general, the direction of spousal e¤ects are quite symmetric but women seem to
have a much stronger response to their spouses characteristics than men. It is quite
di¤erent from what has been found in Gustman and Steinmeier (2000) and Coile (2003)
on US data, but to some extent agrees with the ndings of Schellenberg (1994) on
Canadian survey data.
5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to use the panel data structure to model the individualsearly
retirement behavior when a new option, AFP early retirement becomes available. Several
specications of the binary choice panel data model are estimated on Norwegian data.
Main focus of this study is the comparison of spousal e¤ect for men and women.
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The main ndings in the paper are two folds. First, we nd that the employment
status and other characteristics of the spouse have important e¤ects on early retirement
decision for married men and women. This suggests that joint modeling of the couples
labor market behavior is appropriate. The direction of spousal e¤ects are quite symmet-
ric but women seem to have a much stronger response to their spousescharacteristics
than men. Second, the comparison of di¤erent specications of the panel probit shows
that it is important to correctly model the error term covariance structure or equiva-
lently the cross individual heterogeneity structure. This point has been overlooked in
the most practice of retirement behavior modeling when panel data are available. One
possible reason is the heavy computational burden associated with a general correlation
setting. With the development of simulation methods such as simulated maximum like-
lihood, simulate score method and relative fast algorithms for high dimensional integral,
computation is no longer a constraint.
However, some reservations have to be made. First, we need to keep in mind that
the e¤ects we nd in this paper are not really causal e¤ects, since we do not model the
joint labor market behavior of husband and wife simultaneously like in Gustman and
Steinmeier (2000) and Hernæs, Jia, and Strøm (2001). Moreover, our results are based
on a sample of individuals who have selected themselves into quite strong attachment to
the labor participation (the requirement for AFP qualication). We need to be careful
when we want to generalize our results. Finally, although we try to specify a general
covariance structure for the error term, we still made a strong distributional assumption
that uit is normally distributed. It would be ideal if we could specify a semi-parametric
estimator which can relax this assumption. However, the attempt to apply a revised
version of maximum score estimator suggested by Mayer et al.(2002) was not successful.
The numerical optimization for such an estimator, when the number of parameters is
large, is proven to be too di¢ cult to handle, even with the help of genetic optimization
algorithm, simplex method and simulated annealing algorithm.
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